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CLASS GIFT SAVED ALTHOUGH ARGUABLY INVALID
UNDER RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
Carter v. Berry
243 Miss. 321, 136 So. 2d 871 (1962),
aff'd on rehearing, 243 Miss. 356, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962)
A testator left property to his executors and trustees in trust to pay
twenty percent of the income from the corpus to each of his two sisters for
life, to hold and manage the other sixty percent of income, and at the death
of one sister, Edra Mai, to deliver twenty percent of the trust estate to her
children surviving her. The remaining eighty percent of the trust estate
was to be held by the trustees until the testator's youngest grandchild,
whether alive at the testator's death or thereafter born, reached the age of
twenty-five years. At that time the estate was to be divided among the grand-
children, but in no event was the trust to continue for a longer period than
thirty-five years from 1955, the date of execution of the will. The trustees
were authorized to invade the corpus for the support or education of any
grandchild, and any money so spent was to be charged against that grand-
child's share. The trust also contained a spendthrift clause. At the testator's
death he was survived by his two sisters and by two daughters. One daughter
had three children at that time, but the other daughter had none. No provi-
sion was made for the daughters in the will because the testator had set
up irrevocable inter vivos trusts for their benefit. In an action for construction
of the will the chancellor sustained the daughters' contention that the testa-
mentary trust for the benefit of the grandchildren violated the Rule Against
Perpetuities.1 The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed, holding that the
gift to grandchildren was vested, and thus did not violate the Rule. In a
second hearing on suggestion of error, the court based its prior ruling on an
alternate ground: Conceding that if the interest were construed to be con-
tingent, it would violate the Rule, the Court applied the cy pres doctrine to
reduce the twenty-five-year period to twenty-one years.2 The cy pres
doctrine is a rule for the construction of instruments in equity whereby
the intention of the party is carried out as nearly as possible when it would
be impossible or illegal to give it literal effect.
3
1 Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 201 (4th ed. 1942): "No interest is good
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being
at the creation of the interest."
2 Carter v. Berry, 243 Miss. 321, 136 So. 2d 871 (1962), aff'd on rehearing, 243
Miss. 356, 140 So. 2d 843 (1962).
3 Stewart, "Perpetuities-Cy Pres Doctrine Utilized To Reform Invalid Class Gift,"
25 Ga. B.J. 206, 208 (1962):
A familiar example of the use of this doctrine is the application of a fund to
some charitable purpose other than the one originally intended by the testator,
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The court in the instant case refused to follow Leake v. Robinson, a
decision often attacked in American legal writings, but generally followed
wherever a gift is made to members of a class, some of whose interests
might vest beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.4 The doctrine
of Leake requires a gift to a class to stand or fall as a unit. If the interest
of any member of the class might vest beyond the period of the Rule, then
none of the members may take. This outcome is so harsh that the courts have
carved out exceptions to the doctrine. An exception is made where life
estates are given to the children of a living person and remainders to their
issue. All of the life estates are valid, but the children in the class are
treated separately so that only the gifts of principal to the issue of children
unborn on the date of the gift are invalid. 5 The harshness of the doctrine
has also been avoided by so construing the language in an instrument that
afterborn members of a class, whose inclusion would cause a violation of
the Rule, are excluded.6 Of course these exceptions result in unequal treat-
ment for class members since persons who were intended to be included
are not.
Despite a lengthy opinion, the court in the instant case failed to classify
the interests of the grandchildren. That portion of the estate which the grand-
children were to get at a certain time following its utilization as a source
of income by one sister is a remainder because there is a preceding life
when the original gift fails for some appropriate reason. In such a case the
court inquires into the general charitable intent of the testator and then makes a
disposition of the gift to carry out the intention of the testator cy pres (as
nearly as possible).
See also Quarles, "The Cy Pres Doctrine: Its Application to Cases Involving the Rule
Against Perpetuities and Trusts for Accumulation," 21 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 384 (1946).
4 2 Meriv. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (Ch. 1817). Professor W. Barton Leach has attacked
this English decision and its philosophy in many articles. A collection of them is cited in
Carter v. Berry, supra note 2, at 367, 140 So. 2d at 850. Most of the reforms in this
area have come about through legislation. Lynn, "Reforming the Common Law Rule
Against Perpetuities," 28 U. Chi. L. Rev. 488 (1961).
5 Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Hare 372, 1 Eq. R. 550, 68 Eng. Rep. 1319 (1853), is the
leading decision on this point. For a recent American case applying its doctrine of
severable shares, see Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. Second Bank-State Street
Trust Co., 335 Mass. 407, 140 N.E.2d 201 (1957). A typical application of Cattlin is
where life estates in property are given to the children of A, a living person, and remainders
in fee to A's grandchildren. It is clear that any children of A, a person living at the
creation of the interests, will be born within his lifetime, so that all of the life estates
are valid. However, children could be born to afterborn children of A more than twenty-
one years after lives in being at the creation of the interests. Under Leake v. Robinson,
all of the remainders in fee are invalid. However, under the doctrine of severable shares,
children of A are treated separately and their children as separate subclasses. Children of
children of A living at the creation of the interests will be born within the lives of those
children of A, so their remainders in fee are valid. Children of children of A born after
the creation of the interests might be born more than twenty-one years after lives in being
at the time of the creation of the interests, so their remainders in fee are invalid.
6 Colt v. Industrial Trust Co., 50 R.I. 242, 146 Ati. 628 (1929).
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estate to support it. The other portion of the estate which the grandchildren
were to receive is a present interest with possession postponed, if the gift is
construed to be vested. If the gift is construed to be contingent, the interest
is executory since it is unsupported by a life estate. The most contentious
point in the case is whether the interests are vested or contingent. The
absence of any gift following the bequest to the grandchildren, or words of
survivorship, and the discretionary feature whereby the trustees could expend
the corpus and charge the expenditure against a grandchild's share, indicate
that a vested construction is proper. The Rule Against Perpetuities does not
apply in such a case because it is a rule only against remoteness of vesting.
However, the words "divided" and "delivered," and the spendthrift clause
with no right of disposition in any grandchild, favor a contingent construc-
tion. Furthermore, the bequest to the testator's widow, which was to be
taken from income and corpus before any other distribution was made,
7
led counsel for the executors to admit that a grandchild would have to
survive the termination of the trust estate to share in distribution.8 If the
gift in the instant case is contingent, it might vest beyond the period allowed
by the Rule. This is because a grandchild of the testator might be born after
the testator's death, all relevant persons might then die immediately, and
more than 21 years would elapse before his interest vested. The conven-
tional approach of the courts to this problem is to construe the property
interests involved without reference to the Rule. Contingent remainders or
executory interests which might vest remotely are then invalidated.9 Leach
has made a vigorous and persuasive frontal assault on this application of
the Rule because it hinges solely on the classification and construction of
interests.' o
The decision of the Carter court to follow the New Hampshire case of
Edgerly v. Barker" was apparently influenced by a clear testamentary
scheme to benefit the grandchildren, and by the testator's express desire that
his daughters should not take since they had been well provided for in the
inter vivos trust.' 2 The influence on the court in the instant case of reformers,
particularly Leach, is also noticeable. An Ohio court confronted by a similar
7 The widow renounced the gift made by will and settled with the estate, so that her
rights were not at issue. Carter v. Berry, supra note 2, at 337, 136 So. 2d at 873.
8 Id. at 365, 140 So. 2d at 849.
9 Application of the Rule has been likened to an exercise in logic or mathematics.
"It is a dangerous thing to make such a radical change in a part of the law which is
concatenated with almost mathematical precision." Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities
§ 871 (4th ed. 1942).
20 Leach, "The Rule Against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 Harv. L. Rev.
1329 (1938).
11 66 N.H. 434, 31 Ati. 900 (1891). This case was decided by Chief justice Doe, a
man highly regarded by scholars in the field. Leach & Tudor, The Rule Against Per-
petuties 183 (1957).
12 "I have made no provision herein for either of my two daughters . ..for the
reason that I have heretofore made . . . adequate provision for them with Trust Agree-
ments .... " Carter v. Berry, supra note 2, at 340, 136 So. 2d at 874.
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situation would do well to consider the merits of cy pres.13 The reduction
of a period of time which makes it possible for interests to violate the Rule
Against Perpetuities allows a court to achieve a result patently more equitable
than that achieved in Leake v. Robinson. Certainly the policy behind the Rule
Against Perpetuities, an aversion to an ancestor's control of the devolution
of property for many generations, is served by this result.14 The trust in
the instant case would not endure for longer than thirty-five years from
1955, the date of execution of the will, so there seems to be no valid reason
for not effectuating the intention of the testator through the doctrine of cy
pres. 1
5
13 Research failed to disclose any Ohio cases directly in point.
14 Simes, Public Policy and the Dead Hand 59 (1955).
15 Colonel Samuel P. Colt's testamentary scheme was stretched to the limits of
credibility in a series of cases culminating with Industrial National Bank v. Morey, 86
R.I. 15, 133 A.2d 724 (1957).
